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Religious Freedom as a Technology of Modern
Secular Governance
PETER G. DANCHIN†

Two marks of a mature field of inquiry are that its central
problems are well-formulated and that its conventional wisdom is
sound. Even in the most mature fields, however, the conventional
wisdom can sometimes be misleading and the central problems
poorly cast …. Progress can be made only if much of the
conventional wisdom is displaced and its central questions are
reframed.1

I.

INTRODUCTION

The conventional wisdom in religious freedom discourse rests
on two core tenets: first, that sovereign authority must be secular in
order to ensure neutrality towards religion and thus the separation of
religion and state that is foundational to liberal democracy (the
neutrality thesis); and second, that in order to ensure neutrality towards
both religion and non-religion, political and legal authority must
guarantee the universal (human) right to freedom of religion,
conscience and belief so that individuals and communities may
practice their faith freely without coercion or interference (the
universality thesis).
† Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law; Senior Research
Fellow in Law, Inquiry in Law and Religious Freedom, Center of Theological
Inquiry, Princeton, 2014-2015. Part III of this chapter draws on the discussion in
Peter G. Danchin and Louis Blond, Unlawful Religion? Modern Secular Power and
the Legal Reasoning in the JFS Case, 29 MD. J. INT’L L. 414 (2014).
1. Jules L. Coleman, The Architecture of Jurisprudence, 121 YALE L. J. 2, 5
(2011).
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The thesis of this chapter is that these two tenets of the
conventional wisdom must be discarded if we are to gain a better grasp
of the salience and structure of the contemporary politics of religious
freedom. Recent scholarship on secularism has made clear that the
neutrality thesis is no longer tenable. Rather than withdraw from the
religious domain, the modern secular state has been shown constantly
to intervene and seek to reconfigure substantive features of religious
life by distinguishing between what is properly religious in order to
render certain practices indifferent to religious doctrine and thus bring
them legitimately under the domain of civil law. The result has been
the constant intertwining of religion and governance as modern secular
power operates incessantly to determine the scope of religion in the
political order.
The universality thesis has been shown to be similarly
untenable. In fields as disparate as legal anthropology and intellectual
history, the idea that a universal right to religious freedom exists that is
neutral towards religion or protects all religions equally is today
broadly criticized. Rather, it is more accurate to say that the human
right to religious freedom purports to treat all rights-holders equally.
In this move, however, a seismic shift occurs in the relationship
between notions of normativity and authority.
It is now the rational, autonomous human being, as opposed to
heteronomous “religion,” that is the proper subject of normativity.
The individual, now as a matter of right, decides for herself (as
authority) questions of religion, conscience and belief (as object).
Religion is hereby reformulated in accordance with a distinctive
normative model of religiosity: as privatized belief in a set of creedal
propositions to which an autonomous individual gives assent. This
generates the distinctive and unstable co-imbrication of conscience and
autonomy as the “buffered” self simultaneously chooses autonomously
and believes freely.2
The genius and enduring appeal of modern discourse rests on the
fact each thesis is defined in terms of the other. On the one hand, the
neutrality of the political order is said to be secured by the guarantee to
protect the universal right to religious liberty. In this move, the
2. See Peter Danchin, Islam in the Secular Nomos of the European Court of
Human Rights, 32 MICH. J. INT’L L. 663, 708 ff. (2011).
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disciplinary structure and secular practices of the public sphere
combine to produce the believing subject and concomitant postProtestant conceptions of religion (especially in relation to scripture
and rituals) and religious subjectivity (especially as regards moral and
ethical sensibilities). On the other hand, the universality of the right is
said to be secured by the neutrality of the public sphere towards
religion. This requires the state constantly either to recognize or limit
claims regarding the manifestation of religious belief and practice
generating the distinctive entanglement of religion and law in different
domains of the public and private spheres.
This double-structure necessarily generates two interrelated
paradoxes. First, by defining the secular neutrality of the public
sphere in terms of the universal right to religious freedom, the
authority of religion is privatized relative to state authority and its
normativity interiorized relative to individual subjectivity. Second and
as a result, religious freedom is secured through subordination of
religion to the secular power and public reason of the sovereign state.
By defining the meaning and scope of freedom protected by the right
in terms of secular neutrality, the claims of individuals and
communities to religious liberty are in fact limited through a
continuing praxis of legal recognition and regulation.
The chapter argues that this oscillating dialectic between
secular neutrality and individual right defines how the right to
religious freedom functions as a technology of secular governance and
is integral to the power of the modern nation-state. This can be seen in
three key areas. First, in the foundational distinction common to all
contemporary formulations of the right between a forum internum on
the one hand, defined as the locus of religious belief and conscience
ostensibly protected absolutely by law, and a forum externum on the
other, where the outward expression or manifestation of this belief is
subject to state regulation. Second, in debates concerning the proper
subject of the right and whether this can include collective subjects
and actually-existing systems of religious law adhered to by both
majority and minority religions. And third, in cases where conflicts of
value arise between two or more claims internal to the right to
religious liberty itself, i.e. where both sides to a dispute frame their
arguments as a claim to religious freedom.
The argument proceeds in two parts. Part II outlines the two
dominant genealogies that underlie the modern structure of the right to
religious liberty and its twin theses of neutrality and universality. Part
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III then illustrates the three themes discussed above by considering the
recent decision of the U.K. Supreme Court in R (on the application of
E) v. The Governing Body of JFS (the “JFS” or “Jews’ Free School”
case).3 Finally, Part IV concludes by noting how, counterintuitively,
the three issues concerning the conceptual structure, subject and
authority of the right cut across the Western and non-Western divide.
Once the antinomies generated by these paradoxes are made visible, it
thus becomes clear that the right to religious freedom is not a single,
stable principle existing outside culture, spatial geographies or power,
but instead is a contested, polyvalent concept existing and unfolding
within historical political orders.
II.

RIVAL GENEALOGIES OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

There is a common origin story told about religious liberty in
European history, namely, that “it helped establish the basis of
political secularism by separating religion from politics and making
the state indifferent [or in today’s language “neutral”] to claims of
religious truth.”4 On this view, “since its initial formulation in
seventeenth-century political thought, religious liberty has continued
progressively to expand its tolerant ambit to all religions far beyond its
initial mandate to institute peace across Christian denominations.”5
In recent scholarship, however, this narrative has been
critically revisited to show how religious liberty in its earliest
formulation in European history was in reality “an unsteady and
unstable concept, the result of a “‘circumstantial casuistry’ of
historically embedded political concepts” rather than a principled
commitment to the separation of church and state.”6 Ian Hunter has
argued that the “rival and incompatible conceptions of religious
freedom that emerged in early modern Germany — both among the
Christian confessions and then among them and the institutions of
public law and politics — have proved inscrutable to both normative

3. [2009] UKSC 15, [2010] 2 A.C. 728 (S.C.) (appeal taken from Eng.)
[hereinafter JFS].
4. Saba Mahmood and Peter Danchin, Politics of Religious Freedom:
Contested Genealogies, 113 SOUTH ATL. Q. 1, 2 (2014).
5. Id.
6. Id.
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philosophical ordering and to sociohistorical reconciliation.”7 On the
basis of their regional and contingent nature,
the various philosophical attempts to ground religious
liberty in transcendent principles — whether in Catholic and
Protestant
scholasticisms,
Lockean
and
Kantian
rationalisms, or Taylorean philosophical hermeneutics —
have been unable to supersede the incompatibilities at the
heart of these conceptions since their early history.8
The result is that the rights forms we see today embedded in
constitutional and international human rights instruments derive from
heterogeneous traditions and specific political projects. Accordingly,
divergent genealogies coexist within the capacious language of
religious freedom, always submerging or re-emerging in new ways to
refract the political conflicts of the day.
Following Hunter’s work on civil and metaphysical philosophy
in early modern Germany,9 we can identify two main rival traditions
internal to liberal thought which remain deeply entangled in the
normative structure and jurisprudence of the right to religious liberty
as formulated in provisions such as Article 9 of the European
Convention on Human Rights.
A. Civil Philosophy and Secular Neutrality
In the first, older liberal tradition the public sphere was
understood in terms of social peace and religious liberty conceived in
jurisdictional terms.10 This early conception, which predated the
philosophical or “metaphysical” Aufklärung of Kant by more than a
century, derived from a civil philosophy that sought to desacralize the
state and led over time to both the churches losing their civil and
political authority and to the gradual spiritualization of religion.11

7. Ian Hunter, Religious Freedom in Early Modern Germany: Theology,
Philosophy, and Legal Casuistry, 113 SOUTH ATL. Q. 37, 39 (2014).
8. Mahmood and Danchin, supra note 4, at 2.
9. IAN HUNTER, RIVAL ENLIGHTENMENTS: CIVIL AND METAPHYSICAL
PHILOSOPHY IN EARLY MODERN GERMANY (2001).
10. Although this “civil” jurisdictional conception differed markedly from the
older “Two Realms” or “Two Kingdoms” tradition of church-state separation under
which all authority was viewed as ultimately derived from God and only question
was to demarcate what was properly God’s and what was Caesar’s.
11. Danchin, supra note 2, at 731.
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The goal of this double-strategy was not to protect religious
freedom as a natural right against the State but to end religious civil
war by establishing a “neutral” juristic mode of governance over a
multi-confessional society as the means of maintaining a legally
enforced toleration between the rival religious communities. Central
to this strategy was the notion of adiaphora: the old Stoic idea of
actions that morality neither mandates nor forbids which within
Christianity was understood to refer to matters regarded as inessential
to faith but nevertheless permissible for Christians or allowed in the
Church.
On this basis, the civil philosopher Christian Thomasius
declared “virtually the entirety of the visible church — all of its
liturgies, sacraments and theological doctrines — to be morally
indifferent with regards to salvation” while at the same time holding
that “forms of worship were a matter of ‘Christian freedom’ to be left
to the disposition of individuals or groups to the extent they posed no
threat to social peace.”12 The result was that “should any form of
worship pose a threat to public peace then, as something morally
indifferent, it was legitimately subject to the civil sovereign, who had
absolute authority over all matters capable of threatening public
order.”13
In Thomasius’s late seventeenth century civil philosophy we
already see the core features of modern secular power: the Statist
drawing of a line between the religious and the secular through
simultaneous demarcation of the essentially-religious (held to be
absolutely free from sovereign interference) from the religiouslypermissible (external manifestations of religiosity held to be publicly
recognized but subject to limitation by the State on grounds of public
peace and order).14

12. Ian Hunter, Religious Offences and Liberal Politics: From the Religious
Settlements to Multi-cultural Society, at 9.
13. Ibid. This employed a “juridical-ecclesial category to narrow the array of
doctrine and liturgy where salvation was at stake and to expand the array that could
be regarded as soteriologically indifferent and hence to be seen not from a
sacramental-religious standpoint but from a juridical-political one.” Hunter, supra
note 7, at 56.
14. Again, it is important to observe that this strategy was not rights-based.
Modern accounts of neutrality as an objective principle in modern constitutionalism

PETER G. DANCHIN

7

How this occurred in practice, however, was infinitely varied,
contested, and ultimately settled by local and contingent forms of
negotiation and resolved, if at all, by legal casuistry and the coercive
imposition of judgments within regional jurisdictions and national
state-religion settlements. For this reason, the intellectual origins and
meaning of the idea of political neutrality in religious freedom
discourse is to be found not in philosophical foundations but in the
horizon of “the religious, political, and juridical casuistries spawned
by the national religious settlements themselves.”15 As we shall see in
Part III below, this remains an important insight for understanding the
contemporary politics of religious freedom.
Before proceeding, it is helpful to observe how this doublestrategy of spiritualizing religion and desacralizing the state stands in
relation to the better-known argument for religious toleration also
advanced by John Locke in the late seventeenth century. For Locke,
toleration was a right of individuals against an intolerant state whereas
for Thomasius and the civil philosophers it was a right of the state
against intolerant religious communities.16
The juridical construction of religious freedom in German
public law thus sought to establish political neutrality toward ultimate
theological principles as “the condition of establishing parity of legal
treatment for rival religions as equally valid legal associations.” This
marked a shift in the understanding of religious authority as Erastian
control of churches by the State was effected to deny the coercive
authority of religious institutions in enforcing the demands of
conscience. This was the condition of freedom in the private sphere –
a sphere defined, protected, delimited and increasingly regulated by
the State itself.
thus refer to it as creating a kind of “subjectless right.” Christoph Möllers, Limits of
Differentiation: On the Role of Religion in Democratic Constitutionalism,
unpublished paper, presented at LAPA workshop, October 2014.
15. Hunter, supra note 7, at 40. The notion of negotiated and contingent
relations between the state and actually-existing religious communities, groups and
traditions is quite distinct from the notion of “a right” which implies a legal/moral
relation between the state and an individual subject as rights-holder as well as a
background justification not only of the right itself but its distinctive function of
holding others to correlative duties.
16. Ibid. 52. Thus “Pufendorf’s and Thomasius’s conceptions were the
instruments and effect of German imperial public law and the Brandenburg-Prussian
settlement, whereas Locke’s was an instrument of political-theological dissent from
the Anglican settlement.” Id.
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Similarly, Locke’s empiricist epistemology led to a conception
of civil power as directed to the regulation of things that can be
“objectively known,” whereas religious belief was relegated to the
status of “subjective conviction.”17 On this view, the neutrality of civil
law with respect to religion and the truth of particular religious
practices was guaranteed epistemologically by relegating religious
belief to the “realm of speculation.”18
B. Moral Philosophy and Universal Right
The idea of religion as a “subjective belief” which is unable to
be coerced because located in a private mental space marks the
beginning of a new religious psychology and corresponding shift from
the privatization of religious authority in the early modern period to its
normative interiorization in modernity. As Talal Asad has suggested,
it is the idea that the mind is the impregnable bastion of true religious
experience that provides the modern view with its plausibility, i.e. that
coercion of religious belief is irrational because impossible.
Given that force can only secure an insincere profession of
faith and outward conformity, true authenticity rests on the modern
subject’s ability to choose her beliefs and act on them. This
conception of belief as “singular and inaccessible to other locations”
reinforces the idea of an autonomous “buffered” subject able to
separate itself from objects by contemplation, reasoning and
interpretation and choose from available beliefs.
This intellectual disposition and sensibility prefigures the
second, later liberal tradition whereby the public sphere is reconceived
17. Locke’s theory of toleration thus equally relies on a particular conception of
adiaphora: religious matters, properly understood, have no civil bearing as properly
religious practices concern only a care for salvation and cannot harm the life, liberty
or estate of civil subjects. Conversely, there can be no coercion in “religious
matters” as one cannot correct belief which is a matter of private concern. Kirstie
McClure, Difference, Diversity, and the Limits of Toleration, 18 POLITICAL THEORY
361, 377 (1990).
18. It is the “discursive separation from other-worldly concerns” that therefore
underpins the capacity of civil discourse to convert incommensurable expressions of
religious “difference” into a politically indifferent “diversity” of religious practices.
McClure, supra note 17, at 385. On this account, religion as a matter of facticity
loses its epistemological privilege joining other mundane objects subject to civil
regulation.
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in terms of a moral theory of justice and religious liberty grounded in a
complex (and unstable) notion of a right to freedom of conscience and
belief. This conception derived from a metaphysical (or more
accurately
“transcendental”)
philosophical
tradition
that
simultaneously sacralized reason and rationalized religion in a morally
grounded State.
This Kantian scheme generated a new secular morality and
theory of liberal political order premised on broadly Protestant
conceptions of the individual, freedom and religion. Unlike the civil
philosophy of the early modern period, the subject of this moral
philosophy was not religion per se, but the individual as both the
subject and bearer of rights. The category of religion was rationalized
and naturalized into a generically Protestant notion of conscience or
belief understood as internal to human subjectivity while the notion of
autonomy was asserted as the universal basis for political authority.19
While Kant himself maintained the distinction between public
and private spheres – reason for him being “submissive” in the private
sphere on account of the moral duty to follow one’s conscience while
“free” in the public sphere by virtue of the right to “use reason
publicly in all matters”20 – over the last two centuries these
distinctions have substantially been reversed in the modern secular
imaginary.21
This has had a profound effect on conceptualization of the
public and private spheres. If for the civil philosophers and Kant alike
a spiritualized notion of religion as faith or conscience characterized
the private sphere, today the duty to follow conscience has been reimagined as freedom of conscience now understood in terms of
autonomy as an individual right to do what one believes is right.22 The
19. Danchin, supra note 2, at 733-4.
20. Immanuel Kant, An Answer to the Question: What Is Enlightenment?, in
WHAT IS ENLIGHTENMENT? EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY ANSWERS AND TWENTIETHCENTURY QUESTIONS 58, 59–60 (James Schmidt ed., 1996).
21. As Foucault observed, Kant’s conception of public and private is “term for
term, the opposite of what is ordinarily called freedom of conscience.” Michel
Foucault, What Is Enlightenment?, in THE FOUCAULT READER 32, 36 (Paul Rabinow
ed., 1984).
22. Thus, in Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, Kant develops the
notion of a purely “rational religion,” which is premised on the exclusion of theology
from theoretical reason and the grounding of faith in solely practical (moral) reason.
In this way, religion is to be controlled by and be subject to the demands of (secular)
morality. Immanuel Kant, Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, in
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private sphere remains a space of freedom from State interference, but
the basis for this restraint is not respect for religion or conscience per
se, but rather for the individual’s right to choose not only the dictates
of her religion or conscience but any belief at all. This is reflected in
the contemporary formulation of the forum internum as “freedom of
thought, conscience and religion” and comprises the modern category
of the essentially-religious, i.e. as not subject to limitation by the State.
In this way, Kant’s Copernican philosophical revolution had
two main features: first, contrary to older traditions of Catholic natural
law theory, it was non-naturalist: the ground of moral obligation was
to be sought not in nature, human nature, external (clerical or
traditional) authority, or any contingent circumstances of the moral
agent; and second, contrary to Protestant theologies of God as the
moral law-giver, it posited a new authoritative source of moral
obligation now to be found a priori in transcendental concepts internal
to pure reason alone.
Moral judgment was thus to be given autonomously by the
agent to herself — imposed upon the world — under the rational
discipline of the categorical imperative. The first move defined
enlightenment in terms of a particular conception of rationality — the
right to “think for oneself” and be free of heteronomous (especially
religious) sources of moral obligation, while the second defined
freedom as acceptance of what reason dictates as duty (one should
always act in accordance with what one can simultaneously will as
universal law).
The difficulty is that each of these moves involves fraught and
contested claims not only about the phenomenal world, but about an
imagined noumenal or transcendental realm internal to a particular
(Protestant) conception of rationality.23 This new moral economy
marked the reversal in ethical thought in modernity as what was
RELIGION WITHIN THE BOUNDARIES OF MERE REASON AND OTHER WRITINGS 31
(Allen Wood & George di Giovanni eds., trans., 1998).
23. As Foucault observed regarding Kant’s 1784 essay An Answer to the
Question: What is Enlightenment?, the enlightenment as posited by Kant was the
discovery of an exit, a “way out,” a “process that releases us from the status of
‘immaturity’ ” (a state where religious authority takes the place of our conscience) by
a “modification of the preexisting relation linking will, authority, and the use of
reason.”
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previously external and objective (the authority of God) now became
internal and subjective (the unstable co-imbrication of autonomy and
conscience in the double bind of “freely chosen conscience or belief,”)
while what was previously internal and subject to God’s natural order
(human reason) now itself became external and objective (universal
reason in the disciplinary form of the categorical imperative). These
reversals had the remarkable effect of simultaneously rationalizing
religion and sacralizing reason – or what Kant himself in 1793 termed
“Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason.”
In this sequence of moves, the concept of religion and its
authority in political order were fundamentally altered. We can see
this along three broad dimensions. First, it was now irrational (as
defined by rationality itself) for religion to be a “source” of moral
authority, as the only non-contingent, objective source of such
authority is secular rationality which holds that no value other than
freedom understood as autonomy (the right of each person to decide
for themselves questions of moral value) is true.
Second, religion as a category now became understood not as
an external aspect of reality but as an internal subjective “value”
located in the “inner mind” or consciousness of the individual as
subject. Religion was thus a set of beliefs, true if at all in only a nonnaturalist conception of moral value. Such belief was not a genuine
insight into the character of reality but only the subjective attitude of
the thinker who proposed and adhered to it.
And third, the understanding of religion as belief or conscience
became secondary to the master universal value of autonomy such that
any genuine religious beliefs must be autonomously chosen and
affirmatively assented to by the individual as a set of propositions
(subject to the overarching discipline of rationality itself). This is
what scholars such as Talal Asad and Saba Mahmood refer to as the
modern conception of religion and religious subjectivity.
III.

THE JEWS’ FREE SCHOOL CASE

These early histories and antinomies are consequential for our
understanding of the formulation of religious liberty in provisions
such as Article 9 of the ECHR which, as Nehal Bhuta notes,
represents a “bricolage of rights-forms derived from heterogeneous
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traditions and specific political projects.”24 The central argument in
this Part is that this normative structure not only authorizes the state
to intervene in what appear to be mere expressions of religious belief
but in fact involve the State in making substantive judgments about
religion, a domain toward which it claims to be neutral. This has two
paradoxical effects: first, by authorizing the state’s intervention into
the forum internum which it declares to be autonomous and
sacrosanct; and second, by privileging the values and commitments
of the religious majority as the norm against which the religious
practices of minorities are judged and sanctioned in the forum
externum.25
In order to see how these two paradoxes are generated, let us
turn to consider the reasoning in the JFS case. The Jews’ Free
School (“JFS”) was founded in 1732 and is today one of the best,
state-funded schools in London. JFS gives preference to Jews in its
admissions decisions and recognizes the authority of the Office of the
Chief Rabbi, as head of the United Synagogue, to determine who is
Jewish for these purposes. This is permitted under English law but
only on the basis that the determination is made on grounds of
“religious” belief, membership or practice. Under the Race Relations
Act 1976 (“RRA 1976,”) there is no exemption for discrimination on
grounds of “race” which is defined to include “ethnic or national
origins.”
A 12-year old boy “M” applied for admission to the school. M’s
mother, who was Italian Catholic by birth, had converted to Judaism
under the supervision of a non-Orthodox (Masorti) rabbinate. M was
living with his father at the time and they were both members of a
Masorti synagogue. M was denied admission because he was not
recognized as being Jewish according to Orthodox interpretation of
halakhah according to which M would be considered Jewish only if
his mother was Jewish (the matrilineal test) or if M underwent a
conversion under the supervision of an Orthodox rabbi. Given that
the Office of the Chief Rabbi did not recognize the conversion of M’s
mother on the basis that it did not recognize the halakhic authority of
the Masorti Rabbinic courts, and given that M himself did not wish to
24. Nehal Bhuta, Two Concepts of Religious Freedom in the European Court
of Human Rights, 113 STH. ATL. Q. 9, 10 (2014).
25. For detailed elaboration of this argument in a different context, see Saba
Mahmood and Peter Danchin, Immunity or Regulation? Antinomies of Religious
Freedom, 113 SOUTH ATL. Q. 129 (2014).
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undergo an Orthodox conversion, M was denied admission to JFS
(his family’s practice of Judaism notwithstanding).
M’s father sued JFS arguing that the school’s use of the
matrilineal test in its admission policy violated the RRA 1976. A
court at first instance upheld the school’s right to deny M admission.
This was reversed on appeal and the case then came before the new
U.K. Supreme Court. All nine judges wrote separate opinions
reflecting striking differences in judicial reasoning and the
complexity of the issues under consideration. Despite their
differences, most expressed “sympathy” with the governors of the
school and expressed anxiety about the Court’s decision stating that
they thought “something has gone wrong.”26
A majority of five judges (Lords Phillips, Mance, Kerr, Clarke
and Lady Hale) held that the admissions policy of JFS constituted
direct racial discrimination under the RRA 1976 on the grounds that
the criteria used by JFS to select pupils treated applicants differently
on account of their “ethnic origins.” Two judges (Lords Hope and
Walker) concurred in this result but found instead that the admissions
policy of JFS constituted permissible religious discrimination which
had the unlawful effect of indirect racial or ethnic discrimination. The
remaining two judges (Lords Rodger and Brown) dissented finding
that JFS’s admissions policy was neither directly nor indirectly
discriminatory under the RRA 1976.
As a preliminary matter of history, there have been several ways
to view neutrality and equality of treatment in religious matters. As
Christopher McCrudden has observed, British legal policy towards
majority and minority religious groups has moved through at least
three phases: first, a phase in the early nineteenth century of political
compromises accommodating conflicting interests; second, a mid‒
1960s “multicultural” phase which relied primarily on
antidiscrimination law and accommodation of “new” ethnic groups,
and third, a contemporary phase of “constitutional idealism” which
focuses more on “principle” and the notion of fundamental rights as
enacted in legislation such as the Human Rights Act 1998, which
incorporated the European Convention on Human Rights into British
domestic law.27
26. See Heather Miller Rubens, “Something has Gone Wrong”; The JFS Case
and Defining Jewish Identity in the Courtroom, 29 MD. J. INT’L L. 366 (2014).
27. Christopher McCrudden, Multiculturalism, Freedom of Religion, Equality,
and the British Constitution: the JFS Case Considered, 9 INT’L J. CONST. L. (I‒
CON) 200 (2011).
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This shift towards quasi-constitutional liberal principles has
supplanted both the legislative contingency towards religious
traditions and groups of the pre-multicultural phase and the
integrationism and antidiscrimination focus of the multicultural
phase. Consequently, it has been left to the judiciary to determine
how to apply rights to conflicts involving religion, culture and
ethnicity. Practices previously regarded as “ethnic” and raising
correlative duties of non-discrimination are today often viewed as
“religious” to be adjudicated as a matter of individual rights.28 It was
in context of this normative shift towards liberal rights discourse in
British constitutionalism that the JFS case was both argued and
ultimately decided by the U.K. Supreme Court.
Given this background, what does it mean for a nation-state to
be neutral towards Judaism as a “religion”? If neutrality previously
meant affirmative engagement by the state with existing Jewish
communities on matters pertaining to Jewish belief and practice, and
later protection of such minority communities from acts of unlawful
racial or ethnic discrimination, then today neutrality is understood as
the protection of the right to freedom of religion and belief. In this
sequence of moves, neutrality towards religion understood as an
institution, way of life, or tradition has shifted almost imperceptibly
to the question of the right to religious freedom which suggests that
the state adjudicates between competing rights and not neutrality
toward competing religions. This is a shift fraught with consequences
as evident in the three domains of the conceptual structure, subject
and authority of the right. Let us consider each of these in turn.
A. Forum Internum versus Forum Externum
Recall again that the right to religious liberty is premised on the
foundational distinction between the right to “freedom of thought,
conscience and religion” in Article 9(1) and the right to “manifest
one’s religion or beliefs” in Article 9(2). The former, referred to as
the forum internum, is held to be absolute while the latter, the forum

28. Cf. Mandla v. Dowell Lee, [1983] 2 AC 548 (wearing of the turban held to
be an ethnic practice) with R (Watkins‒Singh) v. The Governing Body of Aberdare
Girls’ High School [2008] EWHC 1865 (Admin) (wearing of the Kara held to be
both a religious and ethnic practice).
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externum, is said to be subject to limitations where necessary to
protect public order, morals, or the rights of others.
The European Court of Human Rights has long struggled with
the issue of how to define the content and scope of Article 9(1) and
its religious liberty jurisprudence provides no clear guidance on the
proper object of the protected sphere of the forum internum. What is
of interest here is how the different conceptions advanced in JFS by
the majority, concurring and dissenting judgments respectively
closely track the three approaches that have been adopted by the
European Court of Human Rights of (1) autonomy, (2)
conscience/belief, and (3) collective/institutional autonomy.
While JFS is framed and adjudicated as a race discrimination
case involving unfair treatment by a school admissions board toward
one of its applicants, the majority opinion begins neither by setting
out the relevant criteria of antidiscrimination law nor explaining the
relations and duties of justice owed by one party to the other. Rather,
it begins by citing the seventh chapter of Deuteronomy, the fifth book
of the Hebrew Bible and the Jewish Torah, locating the source of the
matrilineal test in the “clear commandment against intermarriage” in
the third and fourth verses which Lord Phillips reads to yield the selfevident conclusion that it is a “fundamental tenet of the Jewish
religion … that the child of a Jewish mother is automatically and
inalienably Jewish.”29
A genuine ambiguity is thus presented at the outset regarding
who or what exactly is on trial before the Court: is it JFS, for its
treatment of M; or the ancient Israelite religion and its offspring,
Judaism? This in turn generates deeper and deeply opposing
anxieties. If the Court is to permit discrimination on the basis of race,
ethnicity or descent solely because authorized by a religious tradition
or justified on religious grounds, does this not pose a threat to the
very foundations and conditions of our contemporary secularity and
freedom? Conversely, if the Court is to prohibit such a long-standing
practice internal to a religious tradition which entangles religious and
descent-based criteria, does this not threaten the very idea of religious
freedom which has long been understood to encompass the right of
religious persons, groups and institutions to determine their own rules
of belief, identity and membership free of state interference and
regulation?

29. JFS, [2009] UKSC 15, ¶ 2.
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As the reasoning in the majority, concurring and dissenting
judgments unfolds, we see the antinomies and contradictions
characteristic of religious freedom discourse as the fundamental
liberal premises of state neutrality towards religion and universality
of the right to religious liberty are continually entangled with and
defined in terms of their opposites. This is seen also in the arguments
adduced by the parties. Having first claimed to be bound by
immutable religious law, JFS and the OCR paradoxically invoke the
right as a matter of religious freedom to decide for themselves
matters of religious doctrine and orthodoxy. Conversely, having
claimed the right to be free from racial and ethnic discrimination and
to practice their religion freely, M and his parents paradoxically rely
on a distinctly modern conception of religion understood in terms of
individual belief regarded as freely chosen to apply to an Orthodox
Jewish school.
But it is the divergences in reasoning in and across the nine
separate judgments that best illustrate the modern politics of religious
freedom. In contrast to his opening reference to Deuteronomy, Lord
Phillips thereafter steadfastly claims no interest in any religious
rationale for JFS’s actions: the Court will rule on the facts alone, not
on the basis of any “religious” motivation or reason. The implicit
assumption is that the forum internum protects only the right to
choose one’s beliefs, not the immunity of the beliefs themselves.
For Lord Phillips, religious criteria are thus subjective, nonnatural values or beliefs to which a person may choose to assent.30
Religion is a matter of choice while race and ethnicity are immutable,
unchosen characteristics. Whether the matrilineal test is assented to
as a matter of religious motive or belief is thus irrelevant to the
objective fact that M and his mother’s ethnic origins were the factual
ground that determined the admissions decision made by JFS.
This reasoning reverses the normative understanding of the
relationship between immutability and autonomy advanced by JFS
and OCR in their argument before the Court. The OCR
acknowledged that “M was ‘ethnically’ Jewish, in the sense that he
self-identified as Jewish, he was significantly involved with the
Jewish community in various ways, and he was accepted as Jewish
30. Lord Phillips further states that “[m]embership of a religion or faith
indicates some degree of conscious affiliation with the religion or faith on the part
of the member.” JFS, [2009] UKSC 15, ¶ 44 (Lord Phillips) (emphasis added).
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by at least parts of the community.”31 Ethnicity for the OCR was thus
not biological but sociological, involving deep historical practices of
social choice and collective autonomy. On the other hand, the OCR
did not acknowledge that M was “religiously” Jewish because this
was not a matter of individual or social choice but rather was to be
determined by an Orthodox interpretation of halakhah which, as
revealed religious law, was in some vital sense immutable and
unchosen. The telescopic reduction by the majority of an entire
discursive tradition and its centuries-old traditions of reasoning and
interpretation into a mere subjective “motive” (then held to be
entirely irrelevant) in contradistinction to a discriminatory “fact” or
“ground” calls for serious reflection.
The critical point, however, is that in arriving at this judgment,
the majority draws a strong distinction between racial and religious
grounds for exclusion, implicitly thus embracing a specific
conception of religion as a non-racial and non-ethnic category which
itself is authorized by a prior understanding of the essential nature of
religion in terms of interiorized belief.
The distinctive bifurcation of the modern right to religious
liberty between a forum internum of sovereign individual belief and a
forum externum of manifestation of that belief open to limitation and
regulation is in this way mapped onto the logic of antidiscrimination
law: to discriminate for any reason (religious or not) on the ground of
an immutable characteristic such as race, ethnicity or descent is
axiomatically unjust because it irrationally denies the personal
autonomy and valuable choices of others. In this moral economy,
religion properly understood is reduced to a state of mind – belief in a
set of creedal propositions to which a legal subject voluntarily assents
– which is “individual and otherworldly” rather than constituting any
form of activity in the world.
Judaism does not fit into these categories and contests this
conception of immutable characteristics and valuable choices. As
noted above, for JFS and the OCR, the relevant immutable
characteristic is religious as constituted by Jewish religious law
(halakhah) while it is ethnicity which is a matter of social choice.
Indeed, it was central to OCR’s submissions before the Court that one

31. McCrudden, supra note 27, at 13. On the reasoning of the House of Lords
in Mandla v. Dowell‒Lee, if M was refused admission to a non‒faith based state
school because he was Jewish, this would be racial discrimination because “he was
being discriminated against on the grounds of his Jewish ethnicity.” Id.
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could be Jewish according to religious law while explicitly rejecting
any conscious affiliation with the Jewish religion or faith.
The veracity and rationality of these positions are reflected in the
reasoning of the concurring and dissenting judgments taken together.
These judgments reject the majority’s interpretation of the distinction
between racial and religious grounds finding not only that the
religious motivations and reasons for the exclusionary actions of JFS
are relevant to the determination of this question but that the
exclusion of M was made on religious grounds as required by
Orthodox religious Jewish law.
Unlike Lord Phillips, Lord Hope argues that both motive and
reasons for action “may be highly relevant to the determination of the
crucial question: was this discrimination on racial grounds.”32 For
Lord Hope, there is a distinction between the reasoning that follows
from an obligation to comply with Orthodox religious law on the one
hand and from a personal decision or “motive” to apply that law on
the other.33 This yields the first major divergence in reasoning in the
case. In contrast to the majority’s external, volitional and subjective
stance towards Judaism and the obligation to comply with halakhah,
the concurring judgments adopt an internal, cognitive and objective
point of viewing in adjudicating the first level question of the
distinction between racial and religious grounds. This opens the
conceptual space for a different form of contestation as the exclusion
of M is now adjudicated at the secondary level of indirect racial
discrimination permitting JFS and the OCR to seek to justify the
reasonableness of their actions towards M in the forum externum.
This, in turn, yields the second major divergence in reasoning in
the case. In contrast to the cognitivist conception of religion adopted
by the concurrence (albeit with its recognition of the objectivity of
reasons and obligations deriving from a different source), the
32. ¶ 195. However, “once that conclusion has been reached, the fact that there
may have been a benign reason for the discrimination is beside the point.” Id.
33. A similar point is made by Lord Rodger in dissent:
[M’s] mother could have been as Italian in origins as Sophia Loren
and as Roman Catholic as the Pope for all that the governors cared: the
only thing that mattered was that she had not converted to Judaism under
Orthodox auspices. It was her resulting non‒Jewish religious status in the
Chief Rabbi’s eyes, not the fact that her ethnic origins were Italian and
Roman Catholic, which meant that M was not considered for admission.
Id. ¶ 227 (Lord Rodger, dissenting).
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dissenting judgments respond to and are more sensitive to a
conception of Judaism as a living discursive tradition which
encompasses a way of life with its own established and internally
contested sources, justifications and hermeneutics and thus its own
conceptions of religious identity, authority, membership and practice.
It is this recognition that underlies the dissent’s reliance on more
classical liberal ideas of negative liberty and judicial abstention
which at the same time fail to take seriously or engage with the
individual harm suffered by M as a result of the exclusionary actions
of JFS and the OCR.
For the dissenting judges it is implicit that JFS and the OCR as
collective subjects have the right to profess and maintain a discursive
religious tradition free of sovereign interference, even if this fails to
address harms caused to members internal to the tradition itself.
Only the concurring judgments of Lord Hope and Lord Walker
squarely address this issue seeking to balance the conflicting claims
of right of both JFS and M using concepts common to both
antidiscrimination and human rights law of legitimate aim and
proportionate means. Implicit in this analysis is an assessment of the
harms imposed by JFS’s admissions policy on the valuable life
choices and autonomy of M and his parents. Importantly, this is held
to include their right to choose among Orthodox, Masorti, Reform
and Liberal branches of Judaism which the concurrence implicitly
weighs more heavily than the (collective) right of JFS to devise its
own admissions policy and follow the advice of the OCR in basing
criteria for membership on Orthodox Jewish religious law.
In doing so, the reasoning in the concurring judgments implicitly
makes an assessment of the reasonableness not of the matrilineal test
but of the application by JFS towards M of Orthodox conversion
criteria which is found to be insufficiently inclusive and pluralistic.
In this sequence of maneuvers, the question of indirect racial
discrimination based on immutable characteristics is subtly
transformed into a reason-based jurisprudence premised on liberal
criteria and fundamental values of individual freedom and autonomy.
When this reasoning is considered alongside that of the majority,
we see how Judaism is in fact indicted twice: first categorically by
the majority in the forum internum for irrationally prescribing an
immutable characteristic as part of the matrilineal descent test, and
second by the concurrence in the forum externum for unreasonably
denying the valuable choices of M and his parents regarding religion,
a judgment which also implicitly scrutinizes and is suspicious of
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beliefs and doctrines internal to the forum internum of the Jewish
religion.34
In response to the Court’s ruling that Orthodox Judaism’s
membership and conversion criteria were unlawful for use in its
admissions policy, JFS amended the policy to accept students on the
basis of a “Certificate of Religious Practice” which gauges
synagogue attendance, formal Jewish education and community
participation. This change in policy has removed the ability to accept
children on the basis of the OCR’s definition of Jewish membership
criteria and substituted it with a state-supervised policy of religious
practice which is non-discriminatory, cross-denominational and free
of reference to ethnic or decent-based criteria. The school remains a
faith-based school but if it employs Orthodox halakhah as its grounds
for admission, it transgresses the boundaries of state law.
In this respect, the JFS case powerfully illustrates the distinctive
modalities of the exercise of modern secular power. In defining the
meaning, scope, and dialectical relationship between the public
sphere and individual rights, the Court regulates and delimits what
constitutes religion and a proper religious subjectivity as a matter of
English law. This raises considerable anxieties amongst the judges
themselves as the extent of intrusion of state law into the forum
internum of the Jewish religion becomes visible whether
axiomatically as a matter of direct discrimination or pursuant to the
balancing of rights and interpretation of proportionality as a matter of
indirect discrimination.
In this complex set of moves, we see how the concept of
neutrality towards Judaism is defined in terms of the right to religious
liberty which, in turn, is defined in terms of competing conceptions
of neutrality as the majority, concurring and dissenting judgments
34. The separation between private inner belief and public outer act or
expression is in fact “reunited through a suspicion of motives of material interest or
worldly power. In the context of the freedom of religious belief, it becomes
imperative to determine whether acts or expressions of belief are genuinely
religiously motivated. This presumes the power to pronounce upon, and if
necessary probe into, the character of one’s private convictions.” Hussein Ali
Agrama, Religious Freedom and the Bind of Suspicion in Contemporary Secularity,
in POLITICS OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (Winnifred Fallers Sullivan, Elizabeth
Shakman Hurd, Saba Mahmood and Peter Danchin eds., 2015). There is a sense in
the concurring judgments that JFS and OCR are exercising their institutional
authority on the issue of conversion in a way that is not entirely, or genuinely, or
necessarily, religiously motivated.
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each grapple with the implications of state authority vis-a-vis a
competing normative system. The right to religious liberty is in this
sense best viewed as a sophisticated technology of modern secular
power which operates to discipline actually-existing religious
traditions so they conform to those secular spaces and sensibilities
religion properly should inhabit and express.
In each of the three sets of judgments, no matter how the content
and scope of the forum internum is demarcated the Court must make
substantive judgments on what constitutes or falls within the
protected category. The paradoxical result is that the courts must
make determinations that are inescapably entangled with and
premised on religious criteria and precepts in order to define a sphere
“free” from state authority—a private space of exception—which
ostensibly limits legislative and other forms of governmental
authority. This ever shifting and contested process of construction
and demarcation of the forum internum is an integral part of the
public order of the state itself.
As Agrama has observed, the ability to control these distinctions
involves the fashioning of religion as an “object of continual
management and intervention” and this constitutes a mode of
discipline not always articulated in the practice of liberal
governance.35 The reasoning in JFS, however, allows us to see how
such modes of discipline function using the technology of modern
rights discourse. What becomes clear is that both the subject of the
right and the scope of freedom it encompasses are indeterminate
categories. Further, the reasoning in the majority, concurring and
dissenting judgments alike inescapably entangles conceptions of the
religious and the secular as part of the state’s power and authority “to
decide what shall count as essentially religious and what scope it can
have in social life.”36
This involves two critical determinations. First is the need to
identify what about doctrine is “essentially a religious matter”. The
Court’s five to four split on whether reliance by JFS and the OCR on
the matrilineal test is a racial or religious ground of decision
illustrates this first dilemma. Second is the need to distinguish
between “the ‘civil’ and ‘religious’ dimensions of an act, and on that
35. Hussein Ali Agrama, Secularism, Sovereignty, Indeterminacy: Is Egypt a
Secular or Religious State? 52 COMP. STUD. SOC’Y & HIST. 495, 499 (2010).
36. Id. 503. For this reason, “secularism’s power may lie more in the
underlying question it continually provokes and obliges us to answer, than in the
normativity of the categories it proposes.” Id. 500.
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basis decide whether the act is enforceable, punishable, or otherwise
deserving of protection or exemption under the law.” The divergence
between the concurring and dissenting judges on whether the
exclusion of M constituted indirect racial discrimination and the
ensuing lines of argument concerning the legitimacy of JFS’s aim and
the proportionality of its means illustrate this second dilemma.
In both cases, the Court must make an assessment of the
religious beliefs at issue. This necessarily generates a “modality of
suspicion” as the Court considers whether acts or expressions of
belief are “genuinely religiously motivated” and the nature of the
“belief” itself.37 What is critical to this liberal algebra is that religion
be understood essentially as a type of subjective belief as opposed to
any type of objective knowledge,38 and that it not be allowed to
express “material interests or drives towards worldly power” which
are seen as potentially dangerous or threatening, especially to those
values foundational to the public order of the state.
It is precisely the external, heteronomous, non-faith based
imperative of matrilineal descent in the Jewish religion that violates
these secular imperatives. On the one hand, an unchosen imperative
is deeply irrational for contradicting the foundational value of
individual autonomy and, on the other, potentially threatening for
suggesting a source of ultimate authority other than secular reason
itself.

37. Agrama, supra note 34. A similar phenomenon can be traced in U.S.
religious freedom jurisprudence where courts routinely determine whether
“religious acts or expressions are sincerely held to be essential to one’s religion”,
and whether “these acts and expressions are authorized and mandated by orthodox
religious texts.” Id (citing WINNIFRED FALLERS SULLIVAN, THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (2005)).
38. The “circumscribed sphere of religion already articulates the principle that
it ought to be separated from material power.” It is this understanding of religion
and religious subjectivity that underlies the idea of state neutrality between
religious and non‒religious but deeply held beliefs. If this were not the case, “it
would be difficult to argue that the state should remain neutral between belief and
what it sees as knowledge, especially in matters concerning public order and the
governance of populations, when that knowledge is considered crucial to such
governance.” Agrama, supra note 34.
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B. Individual versus Group or Associational Rights
The second dilemma for the Court in JFS, as in all religious
freedom cases, is the proper subject of the right. While the majority
and concurrence differ on the nature of the forum internum, they both
agree that the essence of religion is to be found in a cognitive or
rationalistic framework internal to the consciousness of the
individual, whether autonomously to choose one’s beliefs (for the
majority) or to have and maintain a certain category of belief (for the
concurrence). This conceivably includes the fiction of a corporate
entity such as JFS viewed as a legal subject acting as an individual
decision-maker. For the dissenting judges, however, the proper
subject of the right appears to encompass Judaism and Jewish
religious practices more broadly construed.39
Over the last few decades, a rich albeit poorly theorized body of
jurisprudence has been developed under Article 9 of the ECHR in
which claims to collective religious autonomy have been adjudicated.
The European Court has held in a series of cases that it has limited
jurisdiction to review the processes, reasoning or substantive
decisions made by religious bodies within an area covered by
religious autonomy.40 In similar terms, the U.S. Supreme Court has
recently recognized a “ministerial exception” to generally applicable
employment discrimination laws in the case of EEOC v. HosannaTabor.
The premise of such jurisdictional approaches to issues of
religious autonomy is the notion that it is not for secular courts to
make determinations on matters “strictly ecclesiastical” or involving
religious teachings or orthodoxy. This proposition, however, leaves
open a number of puzzles and dilemmas for the courts. The first
relates to how the relevant autonomous sphere is to be drawn. If the
RRA 1976 was intended to apply to religious schools and domains
39. While neither Lord Brown nor Lord Rodger squarely address the question,
their judgments appear to follow Asad’s conception of religion as a “lived” or
“discursive” tradition which encompasses a practical mode of living and
“techniques for teaching body and mind to cultivate specific virtues that have been
authorized, passed on, and reformulated down the generations.” Talal Asad, Re‒
reading a Modern Classic: W. C. Smith’s ‘The Meaning and End of Religion,’ in
RELIGION AND THE MEDIA 216 (Hent de Vries & Samuel Weber eds., 2001). The
danger of adopting a “pietistic conception of religion as faith that is essentially
individual and otherworldly” is to situate religion ineluctably within a secular
image of the world. Id. 220.
40. Obst v. Germany, no. 425/03 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Sept. 23, 2010); Lombardi‒
Valluari v. Italy, no. 39128/05 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Oct. 20, 2009); Scüth v. Germany, no.
1620/03 (Eur Ct. H.R. Sept. 23 2010).
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such as employment, why should it not apply to the internal activities
of religious organizations in the case of acts of racial or ethnic
discrimination?
Conversely, if the right to religious freedom is interpreted to
provide a form of collective immunity to religious organizations from
legislative intervention in their internal affairs, on what basis does the
RRA 1976 seek to regulate a religious school such as JFS which has
the express purpose of effectuating the obligation imposed by Jewish
religious law to educate those students regarded by the OCR as
Jewish? Some argument is needed to justify this particular
demarcation of spheres, an argument which itself must be neutral
towards religion and respect the right to religious liberty.
A second dilemma concerns how the state and state law are to
relate to and recognize actually-existing systems of religious law.
There are a tremendous variety of constitutional arrangements in the
world today prescribing different forms of relation between the State
and religion(s)41 and this includes a variety of forms of recognition of
and formal relation to both majority and minority religions. In South
Africa, for example, section 15(3)(a)(ii) of the post-apartheid 1996
Constitution expressly contemplates legislation recognizing “systems
of personal and family law under any tradition, or adhered to by
persons professing a particular religion.” Various contingent forms of
legal relation between the State and South Africa’s different religious
communities, including groups living under customary law and
religious minorities with their own family and personal status laws,
have thus been developed through law reform efforts in the country
over the last two decades.42
We have seen how British legal policy towards majority and
minority religious groups has moved through at least two early
phases of legislative accommodation and multicultural recognition.
But what is striking in JFS is how the courts today are employing
constitutional liberal principles and alternatively classical ideas of
negative liberty and judicial abstention evident in the dissenting
judgments to adjudicate these forms of legal relation.
41. Peter G. Danchin, Of Prophets and Proselytes: Freedom of Religion and
the Conflict of Rights in International Law 49 HARV. INT’L L.J. 249, 297–307
(2008).
42. Peter Danchin, The Politics of Religious Establishment: Recognition of
Muslim Marriages in South Africa, in VARIETIES OF RELIGIOUS ESTABLISHMENT
165 (Lori G. Beaman & Winnifred Fallers Sullivan eds., 2013).
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C. Conflicts of Rights
The final and arguably most intractable dilemma in religious
liberty discourse arises when two or more claims of right come into
conflict with each other. The issue here is not the conflict per se
between M’s right to be free from racial discrimination and JFS’s
right to discriminate in its admissions policy on the basis of religion
and belief. We saw how the majority decided this issue by defining
the forum internum of the right to religious liberty narrowly as
individual belief and interpreting the RRA 1976 as a valid limitation
on the right to manifest religion in the forum externum in order to
protect the rights of others.
Rather, it is the disagreement between the concurring and
dissenting judgments on the question of indirect racial discrimination
that exposes a genuine conflict of rights internal to the right to
religious liberty itself. The need to justify issues of legitimate aim
and proportionate means of achieving that aim opened the
deliberative space for claims to religious liberty to be advanced,
albeit indirectly, by both M and JFS as reasons either to permit or
prohibit the adverse impact of the school’s admissions policy on M
and E (and other children not of Jewish ethnic origin in the maternal
line).
What is striking is the disagreement between the concurring and
dissenting judgments in interpreting the concept of proportionality as
to whether to privilege either the individual autonomy of M and E in
matters of religion (i.e. the right to choose conversion under the
authority of a non-Orthodox (Masorti) rabbinate) or the collective
autonomy of JFS and the OCR to determine their own rules of
religious membership.
For the concurrence, JFS was found to have failed to consider
whether admitting children recognized as Jewish by any of the
branches of Judaism would undermine the religious ethos of the
school. Having found at the first stage of analysis that the OCR was
bound by and had the right to apply Orthodox Jewish religious law,
the implicit suggestion at the second stage of analysis is that
Orthodox rules on conversion are insufficiently pluralistic and
inclusive and that JFS should interpret and apply these rules more
sensitively to the values of individual freedom and choice.
This argument does not address issues of racial or ethnic
discrimination (recall that JFS accepted that M was “ethnically
Jewish”) but rather substitutes the concurring judges’ conception of
what constitutes religion and a proper religious subjectivity for that of
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JFS and the OCR. This in fact reverses the logic of their claims,
which were premised on the notion that it is halakhah is immutable,
while ethnicity is a social choice. It is precisely this danger of nonneutrality and interference in matters of religious doctrine and
practice which drives the dissenting judgments towards judicial
abstention and deference to the normative authority of JFS and the
OCR which, in effect, privileges the right of JFS to collective
freedom over the individual autonomy-based claims of M and E.
As a matter of justice, neither position seems entirely
satisfactory. Regardless of the merits of the competing positions, the
interesting question from the perspective of any theory of religious
freedom is why such debates within religious communities create
different normative claims to those between religious communities
and the state. The idea of value pluralism allows us to see that there is
in fact more than one substantive rights claim at issue. Because the
right to freedom of religion is a complicated bundle of entitlements,
each made up of a diversity of claims, it protects a range of human
interests that are often at odds.43 If this is correct, the critical question
is why a majority of the U.K. Supreme Court so easily and at times
without argument privileges one of the substantive rights claims at
issue over the other. Further, if both claims are to be given their due,
how should courts resolve such conflicts?
However approached, it is clear that the historical relationships
between groups within particular societies and their complex
interrelationship within the legal framework of the state are pivotal to
any understanding of how and why conflicts raise concerns for the
right to religious freedom. Such conflicts give rise to both moral and
ethical questions that bear a complex relationship to different types of
relations between individuals and groups.
The general point is that the conflicts which arose in JFS
involving competing claims of religious freedom cannot
meaningfully be addressed or properly understood without taking into
account these collective dimensions of the question and the broader
historical and inter-group context in which these forces and actors are
operating. Paradoxically, this requires judges to turn to substantive
(historical, cultural, religious) values and normative positions that
transcend or lie beyond the competing rights claims themselves. This,
43. Peter Danchin, Suspect Symbols: Value Pluralism as a Theory of Religious
Freedom in International Law, 33 YALE J. INT’L L. 1 (2008).
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of course, results in a constantly contested and thus oscillating series
of antinomies in contradiction to the opening premises of neutrality
towards religion and universality of the right.
IV.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has argued that the dialectical architecture of the
right to religious liberty is a far more ambiguous instrument than
conventionally assumed that in practice often legitimates rather than
alleviates discriminatory practices of the state against religious
communities.
This paradox haunts the jurisprudence of all
contemporary legal systems which face irreconcilable conflicts in
maintaining that religious belief is immune from state intervention on
the one hand, while sanctioning its outward expression on the other.
What is striking in a wide variety of contexts is how courts
have tended to privilege the values and sensibilities of the majority
religion (on the basis of the universality thesis) and discriminate
against minority religions through recourse to the secular concept of
public order (on the basis of the neutrality thesis). As argued in Parts
II and III, these two features are not a result of the misapplication of
the right to religious liberty or the particular religious personality of
certain states; they are instead a product of the contradictions and
antinomies internal to the conceptual architecture of the right itself
and emanate from the fraught and contested distinction between the
forum internum and forum externum. It is for this reason that we see
such striking similarities in the conundrums entailed in regulating
religious minorities across the Western and non-Western divide.
What is most deeply at issue in such cases is not primarily the
belief-action distinction as between the forum internum and
externum, but the distinction between individual belief as an inner
dimension of human consciousness and religion as a discursive
tradition and collective identity of distinct communities. This is a
question that goes beyond public order limitations imposed on
religious rites and rituals and entails instead how the very category
demarcated as “religious” in the forum internum is defined in the first
place. Such a definition in cases such as JFS can be seen implicitly
to challenge the equation of the forum internum with the “neutral”
normativity of belief and the “universal” authority of the individual
as subject alone.

